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THE AAPL FORM JOA AND NON-PAYING 
PARTICIPANTS—“MR. GREEN 
LEISURE SUIT” REVISITED* 
PAUL G. YALE** 
I. Introduction 
“Mr. Green Leisure Suit,” as I will call him, dropped in on me 
unexpectedly in my Denver office where I was employed as a near-entry 
level landman by a major oil company (Exxon) in the early 1980s. Passing 
                                                                                                                 
 * Special thanks to Nikki Hafizi, an Associate with Gray Reed in Houston for her 
assistance with this article. I am also grateful to John Melko of Foley Gardere in Houston, and 
Mitch Ayer, of Thompson Knight in Houston, for their comments and their furnishing to me 
an advance copy of their joint presentation to be made to the Houston Bar Association Oil, 
Gas and Mineral Law Section in October 2019, “An Ounce of Prevention: Strategies for 
Dealing with Potentially Insolvent Counterparties.” Thanks also to Nancy McDonald, Staff 
Landman, Anadarko Petroleum, Denver, Colorado for once again proving that landmen often 
know more about the law than most oil and gas lawyers by setting me straight on the proper 
location for filing UCC financing statements and otherwise providing insightful comments on 
the subject matter. 
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time has obscured details, but I recall most. He entered my office in a pastel 
green, bell-bottomed leisure suit with a gold pukka shell necklace adorning 
his well-tanned, very hairy chest. His girlfriend was dressed in a tight-fitting, 
memorably scant outfit similar to what might be worn today by a “Zumba” 
dance fitness instructor in a women’s workout studio. Her attire was certainly 
not business dress, even by business casual dress standards (to the extent such 
standards existed in the early 1980s). But no matter—she was accompanying 
him for no apparent business reason. 
I had been assigned the task of putting a lease play together in northeastern 
Colorado, in the same area today seeing large scale horizontal drilling and 
development in the Niobrara formation. However, this was long before 
horizontal fracking had come of age, and Exxon wanted to drill vertical test 
wells, perhaps as many as a dozen, at a drilling and completion cost per well 
of several million dollars. I had contacted “Mr. Green Leisure Suit” for a 
farmout of his approximately 10% leasehold position on the prospect. Mr. 
Green Leisure Suit was the son of a well-known, wealthy, Houston 
businessman—a fact that I, having recently moved to Colorado from Texas, 
was unduly impressed by.  
Mr. Green Leisure Suit told me he was in town to snow ski but wanted to 
respond to my farmout request in person while he was here. He then told me 
he wanted to join in the wells, not farm out. I explained to him that even a 
10% interest could cost him millions of dollars, given how expensive the 
wells were and the number of them that Exxon planned to drill. I also warned 
him about Exxon’s propensity at the time for significant cost overruns. His 
response was something like, “Not a problem, I’m ready to run with the big 
dogs. So, let’s drill these suckers, where do I sign?” 
I then had my secretary prepare a stack of authorities for expenditure 
(“AFEs”) and signature pages to a Model Form American Association of 
Professional Landmen (“AAPL”) 610 Operating Agreement (probably the 
1977 version), all of which Mr. Green Leisure Suit enthusiastically executed. 
The deal with Mr. Green Leisure Suit closed, Exxon commenced its 
exploration program. We drilled six or seven dry holes in a row before 
abandoning the play. There were significant cost overruns. Mr. Green 
Leisure Suit’s final share of costs was two to three million dollars, which 
would be a fair amount of money today and was even more so in the early 
1980s. 
A month or so after we shut the program down, our accounting department 
contacted me. As it turned out, Exxon had billed Mr. Green Leisure Suit for 
his share of costs, but he never paid anything. Accounting asked me to 
contact him about the overdue bills. I tracked him down to a hotel room in 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/6
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Las Vegas where the phone was answered by a woman, different from the 
first, made obvious by a thick foreign accent. She explained that Mr. Green 
Leisure Suit could not come to the phone, but he wanted me to know his 
“check was in the mail.” 
A month later I received a letter in the mail, but no check was enclosed. 
Instead, I found Mr. Green Leisure Suit’s notice of personal bankruptcy filing 
in federal bankruptcy court in the U.S. Southern District of Texas (Houston). 
Exxon, as an unsecured creditor, was to stand in line behind scores of secured 
banks and lending institutions and ultimately had to write off the two to three 
million dollars. Somehow my career survived, probably because in the early 
1980s Exxon was enjoying record gross annual corporate revenues in the 
billions upon billions of dollars range and a two to three million dollars write 
off was insignificant. Additionally, my old boss transferred to a new job and 
my new boss did not connect the dots. So, it happened that I had my first 
encounter with a non-paying non-operator. It was not to be my last. 
II. Mr. Green Leisure Suit Redux 
Some readers may recognize Mr. Green Leisure Suit from a previous 
article I have written on this same subject published in the Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Foundation Journal in 2014.1 To those readers, I apologize. To 
paraphrase the celebrated twentieth century classicist Moses Hadas, perhaps 
“this [paper] fills a much-needed gap.”2 
But given the extraordinary circumstances that have occurred in the U.S. 
oil patch since early 2014, a revisit of issues raised with non-paying 
participants under operating agreements seems appropriate. When I wrote the 
previous article in late 2013, worldwide crude oil prices were in the range of 
$100 a barrel.3 Many observers were still bullish on the price of oil, at least 
in the long term.4 To some, however, trouble seemed to lurk on the horizon: 
                                                                                                                 
 1. This paper is based on another entitled Mr. Green Leisure Suit Revisited: The AAPL 
Form JOA and Non-Paying Participants originally published by the Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Foundation in the manual of the Special Institute on Joint Operations and the New AAPL 
Form 610-2015 Model Form Operating Agreement (2017). 
 2. ROBERT BYRNE, THE 637 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 108, (Fawcett 1st ed. 
1982) (crediting the original quote “This book fills a much-needed gap” to a review by Moses 
Hadas (1900–1966)).  
 3. See Average Crude Oil Spot Price, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/indicators/ 
average_crude_oil_spot_price (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
 4. See Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040 (2013), EXXONM OBIL (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Energy-and-environment/Energy-resources/Outlook-for-
Energy/Outlook-for-Energy-A-perspective-to-2040. 
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“… Justification [for taking steps to address non-paying JOA 
participants] can be found by reflecting on the experience of the 
oil and gas industry in the United States in the mid-1980s and 
comparing it with the eerily similar situation that the industry 
finds itself in at the time this article is being written in late 2013. 
Crude oil production in the United States is at the highest level 
since the 1980s. President Obama and his administration are 
negotiating a lifting of sanctions with Iran which can potentially 
unleash millions of barrels of crude oil onto world markets. For 
the short term, at least, Middle Eastern oil supplies together with 
new U.S. production coming on-stream appear to be more than 
adequate in filling international oil demand. Is an oil price crash 
similar to what was experienced in the mid-1980s out of the 
question in the mid-2010s? If such a crash were to re-occur how 
many non-operators (and operators for that matter) might find 
themselves in serious financial trouble? History, unfortunately, 
tends to repeat itself.”5 
Readers of my 2014 article may recognize that paragraph. For once it 
appears that I wrote something percipient. History did repeat itself—in 
spades. Oil prices dropped from their 2013 highs of over $100 a barrel to a 
low of under $30 a barrel in January 2016.6 Between January, 2015 and 
November 20, 2019, 208 oil and gas producers filed for bankruptcy in the 
wake of falling prices and a struggling commodities market.7 Moreover, in 
2019, the U.S. Energy Information Agency released its Annual Energy 
Outlook forecast predicting that crude oil prices are not likely to approach 
$100 a barrel again for more than a dozen years.8 Recent events have not 
changed the fundamental downward spiral of oil prices that started in 2013. 
Though oil prices rallied in 2017–2019,9 U.S. oil prices dropped to almost 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Yale, supra note 1, at 342–43.  
 6. WTI Crude Oil Prices – 10 Year Daily Chart, M ACROTRENDS, https://www.macro 
trends.net/2516/wti-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
 7. Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor, HAYNESBOONE (Jan. 17, 2020, https://www. 
haynesboone.com/-/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/oil_patch_bankruptcy_monitor. 
ashx?la=en&hash=D2114D98614039A2D2D5A43A61146B13387AA3AE.. 
 8. Annual Energy Outlook 2019, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia. 
gov/forecasts/aeo/data/browser (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (referencing Brent crude oil from 
the North Sea).  
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$50 a barrel more recently in the summer of 2019 before recovering back to 
$60 a barrel following tensions in the Middle East.10  
To those who read and acted upon some of the recommendations in my 
2014 article, congratulations. To those who did not, I am sure you have plenty 
of company. Perhaps this time around I will have earned your attention. 
I have another reason for revisiting the subject. I received a surprisingly 
large number of comments on my 2014 article. Several people, including 
some very seasoned industry professionals, expressed surprise that filing a 
UCC financing statement was necessary to properly perfect the lien provided 
for in Article VII of the 1989 AAPL Form Operating Agreement. Others said 
I needed to include more about the proper location for filing UCC financing 
statements. Several people commented that I should have focused more on 
unscrupulous, non-paying operators, instead of focusing only on non-
operators. I am grateful for these comments and will respond to them in this 
revised version of my 2014 paper.  
Another somewhat stinging but true comment I received from an old 
friend and law school classmate was that the central character in my story, 
“Mr. Green Leisure Suit,” was a bit dated (and by implication, so was I). 
Ignoring the personal slight, his point was that, though hucksters are still 
around, today they are better disguised. Instead of individuals, today’s non-
paying participants are more prone to be an entity or group of entities. Instead 
of being backed by a rich daddy, or the failed Texas and Oklahoma banks of 
the 1980s, today’s non-paying participants are more likely backed by private 
equity or other unregulated sources of financing whose credit wherewithal is 
opaque at best. When banks do get involved in energy lending, the credit 
provided is often subject to multiple tranches of senior and junior mezzanine 
debt sandwiched between syndicated secured lenders and other (unsecured) 
equity holders—which is then made subject to conforming and non-
conforming revolving credit facilities with semi-annual borrowing base re-
determinations, hedges, and a multitude of other nearly indecipherable 
modern oil and gas financing arrangements.11 All of which can create traps 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Myra P. Saefong, Oil Prices May Drop Back Toward the Year’s Lows Near $50 a 
Barrel, M ARKETWATCH (Aug. 24, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/oil-prices-may-drop-back-toward-the-years-lows-near-50-a-barrel-2019-08-23; Laura 
He et al, US oil prices had their biggest spike in a decade after Saudi attack disrupts global 
supply, CNN BUS. (Sept. 16, 2019, 4:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/15/business/oil-
prices-donald-trump-spr/index.html. 
 11. This statement is not to imply that there is not a highly specialized group of energy 
lenders and their lawyers in New York, Houston, Dallas, Oklahoma City and other energy 
financing centers who fully understand and make their living documenting such transactions. 
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for unwary operators and opportunities for less-than-scrupulous modern day 
JOA participants to exploit. 
As Houston bankruptcy lawyer John Melko observed in 2008, there are 
still plenty of oil and gas “outfits that [have] more sizzle than steak.”12 
Though a modern “Mr. Green Leisure Suit” may be more disguised than in 
the early 1980s, challenges in dealing with non-paying participants under 
JOAs remain much the same. “Mr. Green Leisure Suit,” therefore, can still 
be relevant as a lesson and metaphor for all non-paying participants under 
JOAs past and present. It is in that metaphorical sense that I will be referring 
to “Mr. Green Leisure Suit” through the rest of this paper.  
Some things have not changed since my article was first published in 2014. 
Article VII of the Model Form JOA is the provision in the 2015 Model Form 
which is most relevant to the problem of non-paying participants. Generally, 
the changes being brought forward in the 2015 Model Form Operating 
Agreement to Article VII are relatively minor. 
More broadly, the issue of the non-paying participant under the AAPL 
Form JOA is not new. Provisions dealing with non-paying parties have been 
found in all versions of the AAPL Model JOA beginning with the first one 
in 1956. This updated version of my 2014 article is written to benefit new 
readers who wish to get their arms around the old problem of non-paying 
participants under the AAPL Form JOA. It is also written for prior readers 
who want an update so they can remain vigilant in their efforts to avoid this 
recurring problem. To those past readers who remain indifferent or who have 
had their fill of the subject, another quote attributed to Moses Hadas may 
seem appropriate: “Thank you for sending me a copy of your book, I’ll waste 
no time reading it.”13 
  
                                                                                                                 
For an excellent and highly informative account of the history of oil and gas financing from 
inception of the American oil and gas industry to the near present, and especially the oil 
industry financing turmoil of the 1980s, see BERNARD F. CLARK, JR., OIL CAPITAL: THE 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN OIL, WILDCATTERS, INDEPENDENTS AND THEIR BANKERS (2016). 
 12. John Melko, An ounce of protection is worth a bbl of cure, OIL & GAS J. (April 1, 
2008), https://www.ogj.com/home/article/17294629/an-ounce-of-protection-is-worth-a-bbl-
of-cure (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
 13. BYRNE, supra note 2 (crediting a letter written by Moses Hadas). 
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III. A Brief Overview of the History and Use of Operating Agreements 
in the Upstream Exploration and Production Sector 
Some have said that “history is …bunk,”14 but a bit of history may be 
helpful for putting in perspective non-paying operators and non-operators 
and how operating agreements have evolved to address the problem. 
Let us start by answering what an operating agreement is and why it is 
needed. In an oil industry context, a joint operating agreement (often referred 
to by its abbreviated form, “JOA”) can be defined as an agreement between 
one or more parties to jointly develop an oil and gas lease.15 
So why is an operating agreement necessary? In a sense it is not, or at least 
not in writing. The Statute of Frauds requires that agreements providing for 
the transfer of land be in writing, but it does not apply to oral agreements 
providing for operating an oil and gas well.16 In my own practice I regularly 
observe situations where parties operate oil and gas wells with no written 
operating agreement, despite the fact that the AAPL operating agreement has 
been around in one form or another for over 60 years. My perception is that 
this phenomenon has been increasing, which is a troubling, but perhaps not 
unexpected, development given the complexity of shale plays and the speed 
with which companies are developing them. 
So, what do parties do if there is no written operating agreement? By and 
large, they simply act as if one is in place. One party obtains a permit to 
operate the wells or wells, and then it sends joint interest billings (JIBs) to its 
partners for payment. Courts have found such arrangements legally 
enforceable.17 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Charles N. Wheeler, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 25, 1916) (citing Henry Ford as saying 
“History is more or less bunk” during an interview); Roger Butterfield, Henry Ford, the 
Wayside Inn, and the Problem of “History is Bunk,” 77 M ASS. HIST. SOC’Y 53 (1965).  
 15. “Oil and gas lease” here is used in a generic sense, without worrying about 
distinctions between true oil and gas leases (contracts with property rights attached) and 
mineral fee (property rights, only).  
 16. However, those portions of a standard operating agreement which relate to sales of 
interests in real estate would come within the Statute of Frauds. See Michael E. Smith, Joint 
Operating Agreement Exhibits: An Overview, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS, 
2 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. FOUND. (2008) at 12-3 (suggesting that “[w]hile no case was found 
holding an operating agreement to be within the Statute [of Frauds], consider the following 
attributes of an operating agreement,” followed by list of eleven different provisions including 
those covering lien rights, preferential rights to purchase, maintenance of uniform interest, 
waiver of right to partition and other provisions which arguably come within the ambit of the 
Statute of Frauds).  
 17. See Exchange Oil & Gas vs. Great American Expl., 789 F. 2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(applying Louisiana law and finding a non-operator liable to an operator when the operator 
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Operating a well without a written agreement involves risks as well as 
missed opportunities. First, the legal status of the parties under such an oral 
arrangement might be construed as a common law mining partnership. A 
mining partnership is created where co-owners unite to operate a property 
and share in profits earned.18 Courts have found that a mining partnership 
exists with or without a written agreement where each party to a mining 
situation has the requisite “mutual control” or “active participation” in 
operations.19 The law can therefore impose a mining partnership whether or 
not the parties have expressly agreed. As Professor Ernest Smith20 has stated: 
[T]he mining partnership can be described more accurately as a 
legal concept, rather than a legal arrangement. Unlike the 
partnership or the tenancy in common, persons rarely knowingly 
enter in a mining partnership; rather, one party to litigation seeks 
to have a relationship characterized as a mining partnership so that 
certain favorable legal consequences will result.21 
When the law imposes a mining partnership, a couple events occur. First, 
a new entity has been created for tax purposes which can potentially lead to 
double or triple taxation (once at the partnership level, then at a corporate 
level on partnership distributions, and then again when the corporation 
                                                                                                                 
detrimentally relied on representations of the non-operator that it pay its share in the costs of 
the well despite there being no written operating agreement). See also William W. Pugh et al., 
Don’t Get Stuck with the Dinner Check When It’s Not Your Dinner: Indemnity and Insurance 
Issues Under Joint Operating Agreements, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS, 2 
ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. FOUND. (2008), at 6-16; Hunt Energy Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Res., 
Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (regarding a situation where there was no signed 
JOA but the non-operator had signed a written AFE.). 
 18. The three essential elements of a mining partnership are: (1) joint ownership; (2) joint 
operation (or right to participate in management) and (3) an express or implied agreement to 
share in profits or losses. Andrew Derman & Isabel Amadeo, The 1989 AAPL Model Form 
Operating Agreement; Why Are You Not Using It?, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT 
OPERATIONS, 2 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. INST. (2008), at 16-14. 
 19. Derman & Amadeo, The 1989 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement; Why Are 
You Not Using It? (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Crystal Expl. and Prod. Co., No. 83-1275 
(W.D. Okla. Jan 17, 1984), aff’d No. 84-1160 (10th Cir. July 12, 1985)). 
 20. Rex G. Baker Centennial Chair in Natural Resources Law and former Dean at the 
University of Texas Law School. 
 21. Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Non-Operator 
Investors and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. INST. (1986), at 12-1, 12-5. See 
also Milam Randolph Pharo and Constance L. Rogers, Liabilities of the Parties to a Model 
Form Joint Operating Agreement: Who is responsible for what?, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: 
JOINT OPERATIONS, 2 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. INST. (2008), at 5-1.  
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declares dividends and its shareholders must report the income on their 
individual returns). 
Second, partnership liability becomes joint, not several. For this reason, 
practically all form written operating agreements since at least the 1950s  
include a specific disclaimer that a mining partnership is not being created 
and that liability is several, not joint and collective. 
The BP Deepwater Horizon/Macondo disaster illustrates why this liabilit y 
classification is important. If BP had been pulled into bankruptcy and joint 
liability had been found, then BP’s partners would still have been liable for 
BP’s share of all damages, consequential or otherwise. The theory behind 
modern, written operating agreements such as the AAPL Model 610 Form is 
that liability is several, not joint. Non-operators are liable only for their 
proportionate shares. 
Given this perspective, it is easier to understand the industry adage that 
operating agreements exist primarily to rein in the operator. They do this by 
(1) providing that liability is to be several, not joint; (2) ensuring that parties 
have adequate response time to AFEs; (3) incorporating highly detailed 
accounting procedures; and (4) otherwise imposing duties and obligations on 
the operator to benefit the non-operators. 
This is why some operators seem indifferent to whether a JOA is entered 
into. They view a JOA as a relinquishment of an operator’s otherwise near 
total control over the pace and scope of development. 
It is difficult to imagine what other industry would allow the investment 
of millions of dollars in joint ventures with no controlling, written document. 
In some oil and gas companies, particularly the majors, drilling a well 
without an operating agreement violates delegation of authority guidelines 
and leads to career limiting (or ending) audit exceptions. 
Other oil and gas companies have a more casual attitude, particularly in 
states, unlike Texas, which have adopted comprehensive and frequently used 
forced pooling laws.22 If you can force pool another party and enjoy a 
statutory non-consent penalty (also called a “sole risk” penalty) for doing so, 
or if you can send JIBs and receive payments anyway, then an operating 
agreement might seem unnecessary. In shale plays like the Bakken in North 
Dakota, for example, it is very commonplace for operators to simply ignore 
the numerous small working interest owners and corral them under a forced 
                                                                                                                 
 22. The Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act (MIPA) encourages voluntary pooling rather 
than a true compulsory pooling act. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102 (West 2011). See also, 
Ernest Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1965). In any event 
the Act is rarely used, at least in comparison with statutes such as those in North Dakota or 
Oklahoma.  
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pooling order rather than expend the time and effort required to get all parties 
to execute an operating agreement. The same is true in Oklahoma, where pre-
pooling letter agreements are often substituted for JOAs because they are 
shorter and quicker to negotiate.23 
Generally, however, not having a written operating agreement is not a best 
practice. There are at least five significant advantages to having a written 
JOA. First, in Texas and often in other states, forced pooling can be 
problematic. Without forced pooling, and absent a written JOA providing for 
sole risk penalties, you are at risk of having to carry a non-operator with no 
assurance of recouping any more than the non-operator’s share of well costs, 
i.e., all that you would be entitled to absent forced pooling or a written JOA. 
Second, JIBs are easily ignored and often difficult to collect absent written 
agreements.24 In the absence of a written agreement, attorney’s fees are 
generally not recoverable when suing on a debt. 
Third, a written operating agreement can establish a contractual operator’s 
lien on the non-operator’s share of production if JIBs are not paid. As noted 
above, while an operating agreement per se need not be in writing to comply 
with the Statute of Frauds, the Statute of Frauds requires a written agreement 
to attach a contractual lien on real property. 
An operator’s lien is the grant of a security interest by a non-operator 
which gives the operator the right to foreclose on the non-operator’s interest 
for non-payment of expenses due. Such liens collateralize the assets of the 
non-operator[s], turning the operator into a secured creditor. Though 
operator’s liens have had deficiencies depending on the form of JOA used,25 
they can provide a useful tool in dealing with defaulting non-operators that 
is not otherwise available under an oral arrangement. 26 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Jonathan Morris, Address at the Eugene Kuntz Conference on Natural Resources 
Law and Policy: Pre-Pooling Letter Agreements: Not a JOA! (Nov. 17, 2017).  
 24. Pugh, et al., supra note 17, at 16. “Operators have generally been unsuccessful in their 
attempt to collect “dry hole” drilling costs from a non-operator in the absence of an operating 
agreement.” (citing Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Corp ., 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991); 
Zink v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 89-4923, 1992 WL 300816 (E.D. La Oct. 8, 1992). In the 
same section of the paper, however, the authors also discuss cases supporting the operator 
collecting against the non-operator in the absence of a written agreement.  
 25. See Gary B. Conine & Bruce M. Kramer, Property Provisions of the Joint Operating 
Agreement, OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS, 2 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. FOUND. 3 
(2008) for a discussion of some of the most common deficiencies of JOA operators’ liens, 
which include failure to (1) adequately identify collateral, (2) properly perfect, and (3) attach 
the lien to after acquired property, among others. 
 26. There are alternatives to using the consensual lien provided for in the JOA. “For 
example, in addition to any contractual lien, Oklahoma grants operators of pooled units a 
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Fourth, a written operating agreement establishes the right of the operator 
to ask for an advance (also known as “cash call”) on funds needed for next 
month’s operations. Advances under JOAs are typically due within thirty 
(30) days.27  
The fifth advantage in having a written JOA is that written operating 
agreements are simply better suited than oral agreements for developing large 
scale, complicated, capital-intensive oil and gas fields which may be operated 
over long periods of time. Again, in what other industry would millions of 
dollars be invested in joint ventures with no controlling, written document? 
So, for a myriad of reasons, the oil industry in the United States began 
using written operating agreements in the early 20th century, and by the 1930s 
and 40s written operating agreements had become very common. However, 
each company used its own form as a starting point in negotiations, a 
cumbersome and inefficient practice. Consequently, in the early 1950s 
representatives of oil and gas companies, together with independent landmen 
and oil and gas lawyers, began meeting to discuss the creation of a model 
form operating agreement. Early efforts centered in the Oklahoma oil and gas 
community. In 1956, the Ross Martin Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma 
published the Kraftbilt Form 610 JOA. About ten years later, the American 
Association of Professional Landmen took the Kraftbilt 610 form under its 
wing and renamed it the AAPL Model Form 610 JOA. About ten years after 
that, in 1977, the 1956 610 Form was replaced with the 1977 AAPL 610 
Form, and then with the 1982 AAPL Model 610 Form. 
                                                                                                                 
statutory lien on participating interests in the unit to secure the costs of operation.” OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.8 (2011) (voluntary pooled unit liens); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52. § 
87.1(e) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (forced pooled unit liens). 
In addition, and “Unlike Texas, Oklahoma has a trust fund statute that is specific to 
statutory mineral lien claims and is arguably applicable to joint interest billings.” DEBORAH 
D. WILLIAMSON & M EGHAN E. BISHOP , WHEN GUSHERS GO DRY: THE ESSENTIALS OF OIL AND 
GAS BANKRUPTCY 134 (2012) (referencing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 144.2).  
Even in states like Texas which lacks comparable statutes to those cited for Oklahoma, 
there is some authority that a statutory mechanic’s and materialman’s lien could work to the 
benefit of an operator in a situation where there no written JOA. For example, an argument 
could be made that the statutory Texas mechanic’s and materialman’s lien (TEX. PROP . CODE 
ANN. §§ 56.001–56.003 (West 2011)) extends to the operator, because the operator is the 
person with whom the contract with the mechanic or materialman is made. The statutory lien 
provisions of Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico and Colorado are similar to what exist in 
Texas. See Derman & Amadeo, The 1989 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement—Why 
Are You Not Using It?, supra note 18. 
 27. For more on advance payment requests, see discussion infra section A. 
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It was one of those forms, the 1977 or the 1982 AAPL Form 610 
Agreement, that I would have gotten Mr. Green Leisure Suit to sign. My 
problems with Mr. Green Leisure Suit were not isolated. As oil prices slid in 
the mid-1980s and U.S. bankruptcy filings for defaulting oil and gas 
companies occurred on a scale never experienced before, shortcomings in the 
AAPL Model 610 Form relative to non-paying non-operators and operators 
became increasingly apparent.28 
The problem of dealing with non-paying participants was so severe that 
the AAPL in the mid-1980s inaugurated still another revision of the AAPL 
610 Form then released in 1989. The 1989 AAPL 610 agreement contained 
numerous new provisions designed to better equip the parties in dealing with 
defaulting participants. These included expanded advance payment (“cash 
call”) provisions, provisions allowing the rights of a defaulting party to be 
suspended, and provisions deeming a party to be non-consenting (and subject 
to sole risk penalties) if default occurs.  
The 1989 AAPL Form JOA has not been without controversy, and some 
operators either refuse to use it or use it reluctantly because of the perception 
that the 1989 form made it too easy for the non-operators to remove the 
operator.29 My advice to clients has been that if this is their only objection, 
switch out the operator removal provision of the 1989 form with the operator 
removal provision of the 1982 form. The rest of the 1989 form and 
particularly those parts dealing with non-paying participants are so superior 
to the 1982 and earlier forms that there is hardly a contest. 
I will no longer need to give this advice because the latest version of the 
AAPL Form 610 Agreement, the 2015 AAPL Form 610 Operating 
Agreement, was released in the fall of 2016. This new form was the first 
major revision of the AAPL 610 Form in more than a quarter of a century.30 
This time, one of the principal drivers was to better adapt the form to 
horizontal drilling operations. In addition, the operator removal provisions of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See David E. Pierce, Transactional Evolution of Operating Agreements in the Oil and 
Gas Industry, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS, 2 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. FDN. 1 
(2008). 
 29. See Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC¸ 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012), opinion 
supplemented on reh’g (Mar. 29, 2013) for a discussion of differences in operator removal 
provisions in the 1989 versus the 1982 versions of the AAPL 610 JOA. 
 30. The AAPL released a version of the 1989 AAPL 610 JOA with new horizontal 
modifications in December 2013, but that was an interim revision, not a substantial rewrite 
like the 1989, 1982, and 1977 revisions. The AAPL officially released the 2015 Form in the 
Fall of 2016. 
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the 1989 form were re-written in the 2015 form to put the most common 
objection to the 1989 form to rest. There are many other upgrades to the form. 
To close the history lesson, it is worth noting that the AAPL Model 610 
Form has become the most widely used joint operating agreement form in 
the domestic USA, onshore, oil and gas industry. Through the years 
competing forms have been introduced,31 but the AAPL 610 Form has 
remained the most accepted model form operating agreement for onshore 
U.S. oil and gas operations, at least during primary recovery phases and for 
areas outside the Rockies, and it has had a strong influence on both domestic 
and international offshore operating agreement forms. 
IV. Problems with AAPL Forms Prior to 1989 in Enforcing Operator’s Lien 
The desire to have a contractual lien in place for enforcement against non-
paying non-operators (and operators) was one of the historical drivers for a 
written operating agreement. The experience of the oil and gas industry in 
the 1980s, however, revealed that often, the liens provided for in the 1982 
and earlier versions of the AAPL 610 Form JOA were not worth the paper 
they were written on. This was because of the evolution of debtor/creditor 
laws in the United States, which by the 1980s had rendered unrecorded lien 
and security interests less valuable and harder to enforce than they had been 
before. 
Specifically, by the 1980s, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code had provisions 
embedded within it whereby a trustee (or debtor in possession)32 was vested 
with the rights of a bona fide purchaser of real property (BFP) if when the 
bankruptcy case was commenced, a hypothetical purchaser could have 
obtained BFP status. As a hypothetical BFP, the trustee is deemed to have 
conducted a title search, paid value for the property, and perfected its interest 
as holder of legal title as of the date the bankruptcy case commenced. The 
                                                                                                                 
 31. The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation introduced its own Form 3 in 1959, 
and the Canadian Association of Professional Landmen has had various forms available since 
1969. See Conine & Kramer, supra note 25. There are also specialty forms such the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Model Form Operating Agreement for Federal 
Exploratory Units or the American Petroleum Institute Model Form for Fieldwide Units. 
 32. As a technical matter, the concept of a “trustee” in a federal bankruptcy context exists, 
for the most part, only in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Most of the time, in Chapter 11, the debtor 
remains “in possession” and in control of the case and its business and its property , hence the 
term of art, “debtor in possession” or “DIP.” The DIP is vested with, among other things, the 
powers of a trustee to assume or reject contracts, avoid liens, etc. On occasion a Chapter 11 
trustee is appointed to take over operating the business where there has been fraud, 
incompetence, etc. 
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trustee was therefore able to avoid any liens or conveyances that a BFP could 
avoid,33 including the operator’s lien in an unrecorded AAPL 610 Form 
Operating Agreement. 
Now, this problem did not arise overnight, and for many years before a 
small minority of operators routinely recorded joint operating agreements in 
county and parish courthouses to perfect their operator’s liens. But this 
procedure was much more the exception than the rule for many reasons, 
including the per-page cost of recording lengthy documents such as a JOA 
with all its exhibits in multiple counties or even states if the Contract Area 
was very large. The number of non-operators going into bankruptcy was 
perceived to be relatively small whereas the number of operating agreements 
that would need to be recorded was large. In addition, often operating 
agreements are not acknowledged and therefore would not qualify for 
recordation. Rather than undertake the hassle, most operators just threw the 
dice and took their chances. 
Then, in 1987, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in Amarex, Inc. v. El 
Paso Natural Gas. Co. that the filing of a Memorandum of a Joint Operating 
Agreement would suffice to perfect an operator’s lien.34 The industry reacted 
immediately, and many companies began recording memoranda of JOA.35 
The Amarex case was highly influential on the AAPL Committee tasked with 
revising the 1982 Model Form JOA, and the subsequent 1989 version of the 
AAPL JOA incorporated for the first time a recording supplement.  The 
recording supplement was designed to comply not only with the real property 
laws of the states insofar as establishing lien priorities but also with security 
interest provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which had been 
first introduced in the United States in the early 1950s and was eventually 
adopted in one form or the other in all fifty states. The UCC greatly expanded 
upon the breadth and scope of state lien law and provided for the creation 
and perfection of security interests through financing statements normally 
filed in the local secretary of state office or equivalent office. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The trustee (or DIP) can exercise the rights of a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”) 
regardless of actual knowledge, but the trustee’s rights as a BFP do not override state recording 
statutes and allow avoidance of an interest of which a trustee would have had constructive 
notice under state law. 
 34. 772 P.2d. 905, 909 (Okla. 1987). 
 35. For an example of a recording memorandum in the wake of the Amarex case, see 
ANDREW B. DERMAN, PROTECTING OIL AND GAS LIENS AND SECURITY INTERESTS: USE OF 
M EMORANDUM OF OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND FINANCING STATEMENTS (1987) (published 
as part of ABA Natural Resources Law Monograph Series). 
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This raises an issue sometimes overlooked by landmen and other industry 
professionals who work with JOAs. Most landmen recognize that to perfect 
the mineral lien provided for in a JOA, something must be filed in the real 
property records of the county in which operations occur. This is because 
before extraction, oil, gas and other minerals are real property. 
After extraction, however, oil and gas become goods and are no longer 
real property. Therefore, the mineral lien would no longer apply. This is why 
Article VII.B. of the AAPL 610 Operating Agreement establishes both a 
mineral lien and a security interest in extracted oil and gas. For those 
unfamiliar with the concept, a “security interest” is a property interest created 
by agreement or by operation of law over assets to secure the performance of 
an obligation, usually the payment of a debt. In this sense it is similar to a 
mineral lien; it gives the beneficiary of the security interest certain 
preferential rights in the disposition of secured assets. Such rights vary 
according to the type of security interest, but usually a holder of the security 
interest may seize, and sell, the property to discharge the debt that the security 
interest secures. 
A type of security interest commonly seen in oil and gas operations is the 
one provided for by Article 9 of the UCC. A UCC Article 9 security interest 
differs from a mineral lien because it is an interest in personal property and 
fixtures, only (i.e. the proceeds of sales of extracted oil and gas and the 
facilities needed to produce oil and gas such as well-heads, storage tanks, 
processing facilities and so forth). 
Contractual security interests such as the one provided for in UCC Article 
9 are therefore entirely different creatures than mineral liens. Mineral liens 
are real property interests. A mineral lien can be contractual (for example, 
the contractual mineral lien provided for in the AAPL 610 Form JOA), or it 
can be statutory. An example of a statutory mineral lien would be a mechanic 
and materialman’s lien recorded on the county records by an oil field services 
provider against an oil and gas well operator delinquent on his or her bills.36 
A statutory mineral lien might create a foreclosable interest in minerals in 
place but in Texas, at least, arguably does not attach to the proceeds of 
production.37 The contractual lien and security interest provided for in the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See e.g., TEX. PROP . CODE ANN. § 56.001 (West 2011).  
 37. See David Lauritzen, Speech at the 29th Annual Energy Law institute of Attorney’s 
and Landment: Mechanic’s and Materialman’s Liens in the Third Great Oil Bust  (Aug. 31-
Sept. 1, 2016) for a detailed discussion of what the author calls the “traditional view” in Texas 
that mechanic’s & materialman’s liens do not attach to proceeds of production. However, 
Lauritzen also discusses Abella v. Knight Oil Tools, 945 S.W. 2d 847 (Tex. App.–Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1997) and points out that Abella is often cited for the opposite view. See 
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AAPL 610 Operating Agreement in Article VII.B (1977, 1982 and 1989 
versions) creates both a mineral lien and a security interest against the non-
operator’s share of production which explicitly applies not only to oil and gas 
rights in the ground but to the proceeds from extracted oil and gas. 
Recording the JOA memo in the county may suffice to perfect a mineral 
lien in oil and gas when it is still in the ground. But to perfect a JOA security 
interest in extracted oil and gas, special steps must be taken under Article 9 
of the UCC which go beyond recording the memorandum in the county. 
“Perfection” of a security interest is UCC terminology for the process of 
providing notice to all creditors of security interests in property.38 
Essentially, this involves filing a “financing statement” with the secretary of 
state.39 The authors of the 1989 AAPL 610 JOA recognized the issue and 
incorporated the most common UCC financing statement requirements into 
                                                                                                                 
WILLIAMSON & BISHOP , supra note 26, at 17 n.337. But see also WILLIAMSON & BISHOP , supra 
note 26, at 116–23. The authors discuss the Abella case and highlight that even in Texas, 
mineral lien claimants might have the right under state law to commence a lien foreclosure 
action and request the appointment of a receiver who could seize and preserve the proceeds of 
production. Additionally, the authors express that Oklahoma is a state where mechanic’s and 
materialmen’s liens by statute explicitly attach to the proceeds from the sale of produced oil 
and gas. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 144 (2013).  
 38. See Derman & Amadeo, supra note 18, at 10. 
 39. An operator’s security interest in proceeds otherwise owed non-paying participants is 
unperfected under the AAPL 610 JOA unless it is recorded at the secretary of state’s (or 
equivalent) office. To further emphasize consider that in 1983 the Texas legislature enacted a 
non-uniform, Texas-specific UCC article which gave producers and royalty owners an 
automatically perfected security interest on severed oil and gas sales proceeds held by a first 
purchaser without the necessity of filing a financing statement. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.343 (West 2011). The thought was that royalty owners, in particular, are apt to be 
unsophisticated when it comes to compliance with UCC Article 9 financing statement 
provisions, so an exemption seemed appropriate. The drafters expanded the coverage in 1987 
when they amended the definition of “first purchaser” to expressly include the operator who 
disburses proceeds of production. H.B. 2591, 70th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1987). Note, however, that 
§ 9.343 (sometimes referred to as the “producer’s lien,” See CLARK, supra note 11, at 209) 
only applies to funds in the hands of a first purchaser (or an operator acting in that capacity). 
It does not relieve the requirement of filing a JOA memorandum as a financing statement at 
the secretary of state’s office in order to attach a lien on proceeds which may be due for unpaid 
JIBs or other sums due from a participant under the JOA. Other states, likewise, have similar 
“producer’s liens” including Kansas, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. Oklahoma’s 
statute was originally part of its version of the Uniform Commercial Code but was later 
replaced with a statutory lien by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 548-549.12 (West 1988). See 
CLARK, supra note 11, at 208. 
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a “Memorandum of Operating Agreement and Financing Statement normally 
attached to the operating agreement as Exhibit H.”40 
The technical requirements of UCC financing statements can vary from 
state to state and a detailed discussion of what is required to perfect a security 
interest under UCC Article 9 is beyond the scope of this article. However, a 
topic that has come to my attention since I wrote the earlier version of this 
paper relates to which secretary of state’s office the “financing statement” 
must be filed in, namely whether the proper office is the one in the state where 
the Contract Area is located or where the JOA participant is organized 
Article VII B of the 1989 Form and the new 2015 AAPL Form JOA both 
state that: 
 “to perfect the lien and security agreement provided herein, each 
party hereto shall execute and acknowledge the recording 
supplement and/or any financing statement prepared and 
submitted by any party hereto in conjunction herewith or at any 
time following execution hereof, and Operator is authorized to file 
this agreement or the recording supplement executed herewith as 
a lien or mortgage in the applicable real estate records and as a 
financing statement in the applicable real estate records and as a 
financing statement with the proper officer under the [UCC] in the 
state in which the Contract Area is situated and such other states 
as Operator shall deem appropriate to perfect the security interest 
granted hereunder.”41  
This language followed Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as it was 
in place when the 1989 AAPL Model Form Agreement was developed in the 
late 1980s in that the financing statements were to be filed with the secretary 
of state in the state in which the collateral was located. 
However, in the late 1990s Article 9 of the UCC was amended to address 
situations where collateral is moved to another state. For example, a hardware 
store in New Jersey but incorporated in Delaware might take out a loan from 
a local bank and offer its inventory as collateral. Before the late 1990s 
changes to the Uniform Commercial Code, the bank would file its financing 
statement with the New Jersey Secretary of State. But then, unbeknownst to 
the bank, the hardware store owner moves his store to New York, taking his 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See e.g., ANDREW B. DERMAN, THE NEW AND IMPROVED 1989 OPERATING 
AGREEMENT: A WORKING M ANUAL (1991) (published as number fifteen in the ABA Natural 
Resources Law Monograph Series). 
 41. Emphasis added. 
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collateralized inventory with him. The collateral in New York is then pledged 
for another loan and the New York bank then perfects its lien by filing a UCC 
Financing Statement with the New York Secretary of State. By the time the 
bank in New Jersey discovered it and refiled the financing statement in New 
York, the hardware store was bankrupt. The New Jersey bank then 
discovered it was junior to the New York lienholder. 
To address this problem, a revised version of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code came out in the late 1990s. The rules for determining the 
proper location for filing financing statements are complex. For example, the 
appropriate place to file a financing statement when the debtor is a registered 
organization (such as corporations, LLCs, and so forth, a category including 
the majority of signatories to the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement) 
would be the state where the debtor is registered, not the state where the 
collateral is located, under UCC Section 9.307 (e). The theory was that 
lenders should not have to continually monitor collateral moving from state 
to state.42  
The problem is, the 1989 AAPL Model Form and now the 2015 Form refer 
to the Operator’s filing the financing statement with the proper officer under 
the [UCC] “in the state in which the Contract Area is situated  and [italics 
and underlining added] such other states as Operator shall deem 
appropriate….” With a registered entity this would arguably mean that the 
financing statement should be recorded in two places: the state where the 
Contract Area is located and the state where the JOA participant’s entity was 
registered. 
It makes little sense that the person seeking to perfect a lien under the 
AAPL Model 610 Form JOA would have to go beyond the UCC when it 
comes to filing UCC financing statements. Surely the drafters of the Model 
Form did not intend this result. This issue may be for a court to decide, but 
in the interim, it is important to note that the lien created by the AAPL Model 
Form JOA is a contractual lien, not a statutory lien. All elements of the 
contract must be met or arguably a statutory lien is void. 
Regardless, filing the financing statement in the state where the Contract 
Area is located is advisable because oil and gas transform from real property 
to proceeds only after point of sale. Another issue that arises is whether the 
financing statement must be centrally filed where the secretary of state’s 
office is (usually in the state capital), or whether filing the financing 
statement in the real property records at a county clerk’s office will suffice. 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307, 9-501 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n amended 
2003). 
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There is at least one operator who takes the position that to perfect a lien 
under the 1989 AAPL Model Form JOA, filing a UCC financing statement 
in the county records suffices. This is because the 1989 Model Form JOA 
(and now the 2015 JOA) states only that that financing statement is to be filed 
“in the state in which the Contract Area is situated.” In other words, it is 
arguably unnecessary to file a financing statement at the centralized secretary 
of state’s office insofar as the contractual requirements of the AAPL Model 
Form JOA are concerned. Filing the financing statement in the real property 
records at the county clerk’s office would arguably suffice provided that the 
UCC financing statement is also filed with the secretary of state’s office in 
the state where the JOA participant’s entity was registered. 
But here is a fuller version of the sentence as it appears in Article VII.B of 
both the 1989 and now the 2015 version of the AAPL 610 JOA: 
“To perfect the lien and security agreement provided for 
herein…Operator is authorized to file this agreement or the 
recording supplement…with the proper officer under the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the state where the Contract Area is situated 
[italics added] and such other states as Operator shall deem 
appropriate…” 
The question is, for purposes of interpretation of Article VII.B of both the 
1989 and now the 2015 version of the AAPL 610 JOA, is the “proper officer 
under the Uniform Commercial Code in the state where the Contract Area is 
situated” exclusively the centralized office of the secretary of state (which is 
typically in the state capital)? Or could the county clerk in whatever county 
the Contract Area is located be in effect the representative of the secretary of 
state so the requirements of Article VII.B are met if: 1) the financing 
statement is filed in the state where the JOA participant’s entity is registered, 
and 2) filed in the county records? Or would it also be required for purposes 
of Article VII.B that the financing statement be filed at a third location —the 
centralized records of the secretary state in the state capital of the state where 
the Contract Area is located? 
There is no case authority that addresses this question. Common sense 
would suggest that the authors of Article VII.B would have intended that 
whatever course of action that imposes the least burden on the JOA 
participant filing the financing statement consistent with the law should win 
the day. Having to file a UCC financing statement in three locations is not 
only beyond the UCC as it has been in effect since the late 1990s, but would 
seem unduly burdensome and beyond the reasonable scope of what the 
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authors of Article VII.B in both the 1989 and the 2015 AAPL Form JOA 
forms would have intended. 
Another issue raised following the earlier version of this article is “what 
about as-extracted collateral?” The Uniform Commercial Code at Article 9-
301(4) states that liens on as-extracted collateral are to be filed under the 
local law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located, which normally 
means the real property records in the county. There is no requirement that a 
lien on as-extracted collateral be likewise filed at the secretary of state’s 
office. As-extracted collateral can include harvested timber, or oil in the tanks 
or gas in the pipeline. What distinguishes as-extracted collateral from 
proceeds is point of sale. Before the point of sale, as-extracted collateral such 
as oil in the tanks retains its real property character insofar as the UCC is 
concerned; after point of sale it becomes proceeds and UCC financing 
statement requirements become applicable. 
Suffice to say that the rules determining when and where a UCC financing 
statement is to be filed are complex and can vary depending on the version 
of the UCC or other laws of the state in place where the Contract Area is 
located.43 This, of course, sounds very complicated and time consuming for 
hard-pressed landmen and their attorneys to deal with. So what happens if 
you are the operator under an AAPL Model Form 610 JOA and you record 
the JOA in the county (or parish) records, but neglect to file a financing 
statement with the secretary of state (or file the financing statement in the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Though not a JOA case, the seminal 2009 SemGroup bankruptcy case (Samson Res. 
Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re Semcrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D. Del., 2009), add’d 428 
B.R. 590 (D.Del. 2010)) illustrates how important it is to perfect liens in the right place. In 
July 2008 SemGroup L.P. filed for bankruptcy in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware after 
suffering a $2.4 billion loss incurred when short positions went awry. Despite the fact that the 
“producer’s liens” had been automatically perfected in Texas pursuant to the Texas version of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, discussed supra in notes 36 & 38 (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. §9.343 (West 2011), the Delaware bankruptcy court held that the automatically perfected 
lien in Texas would be junior to purchase-money security interests in accounts receivable held 
by SemCrude because SemCrude, as a Delaware entity, was subject to Delaware law which 
controlled over the local laws of the states where the producers delivered and sold their oil. 
Delaware law did not recognize automatic perfection and required financing statements to be 
filed locally in Delaware. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 208–09, and 334–35. The lower 
priority in the SemCrude case resulted in a loss to the Texas owner’s interest in oil and gas 
proceeds of approximately $57 million. See Ayer, supra note 26, at 7. See further discussion 
in Ayer, supra note 26, at 8. For a more recent, related SemCrude proceeding, see Arrow Oil 
& Gas, Inc. v. J. Aron & Co. (In re SemCrude L.P), 864 F.3d 280, 301 (3rd Cir. 2017) where 
the 3rd Circuit discussed how important it is in order to get the best priority for a Texas 
producer’s lien to file the financing statement in the state of incorporation of the first purchaser 
and not rely on automatic perfection.  
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wrong secretary of state’s office 44), and the operator fails to pay and/or goes 
bankrupt?  
Lenders financing oil and gas operations usually take both a mortgage (or 
in Texas, a deed of trust) on the real property and a security interest that 
attaches to the extracted oil and gas as they become goods. First purchasers 
such as gatherers, processors, pipeline companies, or marketers likewise 
might give their lenders a lien and financing statement on extracted oil and 
gas. So the operator under an AAPL Model Form JOA must be prepared to 
assert its mineral lien and security interest against a variety of lenders and 
other lien holders who will invariably have filed both mineral liens and 
financing statements. 
Battles between secured lenders and mineral lien claimants over who is 
first-in-right to oil and gas leasehold collateral and who has the best claim to 
proceeds of production can be among the most divisive issues in foreclosure, 
bankruptcy and other creditor’s rights proceedings.45 Having properly 
perfected a security interest by filing a financing statement with the proper 
secretary of state’s office may or may not lead an operator to prevail over 
another secured creditor; but not having properly perfected a security interest 
by both recording a JOA in the county records and filing a financing 
                                                                                                                 
 44. For another example of how filing a financing statement in the State where the 
collateral was located but not in the state where the debtor was registered resulted in a 
creditor’s claim being denied priority, see Diabetes America, Inc. v. Frank Basile, 2012 WL 
6694074, United States Bankruptcy Court(S.D. Texas, Houston Division 2012).  
 45. WILLIAMSON & BISHOP , supra note 26, at 71. See also Brookner, et al., Farmout 
Agreements in Bankruptcy: Lessons Learned from the VNR Bankruptcy, GRAY REED & 
M CGRAW LLP, https://www.grayreed.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/cp -base-4-
100604/media.name=/This%20Land%20Is%20Your%20Land%20This%20Land%20Is%20
My%20Land%20-%20Farmout%20Agreements%20in%20Bankruptcy.pdf (last visited Jan. 
28, 2020), at 11. An operating agreement is generally thought of as an executory contract 
which may be either assumed or rejected within the time frames specified by § 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. However, there are arguments that can be made against rejecting operating 
agreements as executory contracts, or at least certain parts of them, such as the lien provisions. 
This gets into the “safe harbor” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code found at 11 U.S.C. § 
541(b)(4) and other highly complex provisions and nuances of bankruptcy law which are 
beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent discussion of these “safe harbor rules” and 
many other topics related to oil and gas bankruptcy , see generally Ayer, supra note 26. For a 
particularized discussion of “safe harbor rules relative to farmouts, which can include JOA 
non-consent interests, and production payments, see Ayer, supra note 26 at 20–22. Essentially 
the “safe harbor” rules exclude certain properties of the debtor and related creditors from the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.  
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statement at the appropriate secretary of state’s office seems a near certain 
path to defeat.46 
So what happens if an operator files a UCC financing statement in the 
wrong secretary of state’s office, a non-operator goes bankrupt, and the 
operator’s claim filed on behalf of the joint account in the bankruptcy 
proceeding loses priority due to the improper filing? Can the non-operators 
sue the operator for negligence in filing the UCC financing statement in the 
wrong place? First, Article VII.B of the Model Form JOA says that the 
operator may file UCC financing statements but does not require that the 
operator file a UCC financing statement, so arguably no affirmative duty to 
file a UCC financing statements exists. Second, Article VII.B of the Model 
Form JOA authorizes any party to file financing statements so the question 
might arise if a non-operator sued the operator for breach of duty—why did 
not the non-operator engage in self- help by filing the UCC financing 
statement itself? 
Those questions aside, the new 2015 Model Form JOA provides relief for 
an operator who might find itself in a situation where a UCC financing 
statement was improperly filed or was not filed. Here is the second paragraph 
of Article XIV.C (“Compliance with Laws and Regulations/Regulatory 
Agencies”) of the 2015 Model Form with new language underlined and old 
language from the 1989 form version stricken through: 
“With respect to the operations hereunder, Non-Operators agree 
to release Operator from liability above and beyond its 
proportionate share of any and all losses, damages, injuries, 
claims, and causes of action arising out of, incident to, or 
resulting directly or indirectly from Operator’s interpretation or 
application of rules, regulations or orders of the Department of 
Energy or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Filing a UCC financing statement should not be looked upon as a one-time 
occurrence. A UCC financing statement is normally effective for a period of five years after 
the date of filing and automatically lapses if a continuation statement is not filed/recorded 
within six months prior to the end of this five-year term. A financing statement’s lapse does 
not terminate the lien. Rather, upon lapse, any security interest that was perfected by the 
financing statement becomes unperfected. Such loss of perfection renders the collateral clear 
of the financing lien as against a purchaser of the collateral for value. Therefore, in the event 
a decision is made to perfect a security interest under an AAPL 610 JOA, a “tickler” file should 
be set up to remind the operator to file a continuation statement after a period of five years. 
This decision, of course, requires discipline in today’s world where constant churning of 
personnel and/or overworked staffs tends towards either ineffective follow up and/or or a lack 
of accountability for failures. 
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predecessor or successor agencies any government agency 
having jurisdiction to the extent such interpretation or application 
was made in good faith and does not constitute gross negligence 
or willful misconduct.“ 
This new language in the 2015 form appears to exculpate the operator from 
liability for filing a UCC financing statement in the wrong secretary of state’s 
office. 47 
Besides providing for a better method of perfecting an operator’s lien, the 
1989 AAPL Form JOA and now the 2015 AAPL Form JOA also required 
the inclusion of future acquired personal property and required the parties to 
make representations about lien priorities. There were other improvements , 
in addition. Overall, the lien provisions in the 1989 form and now the 2015 
form are a significant improvement over prior versions.48 
As complex as it may seem, not having a recording supplement executed 
and properly perfected by recording in county records and with the 
appropriate secretary of state’s office at least in connection with new 
operating agreements would appear to be a missed opportunity to reduce risk. 
What bank or other financial institution would not bother to record a 
mortgage or deed of trust and financing statement to secure an apartment 
complex or an office building when rents are due and used to secure the loan? 
Yet, I constantly see situations where sophisticated oil and gas companies 
simply do not take advantage of the opportunity to record JOA supplements 
in the county records and/or file financing statements with the secretary of 
state and thereby make their lien and security interests in minerals and 
extracted oil and gas junior to other secured creditors. I would surmise this 
is primarily for reasons of overworked and undermanned legal, land and 
accounting staff. This may be an area where either reprioritization or an 
increase in staff may yield dividends. Outsourcing the task is another option.  
V. Unique Features of the 1989 AAPL Model Form JOA and Now the 2015 
JOA Form in Dealing with Non-Paying Participants 
One of the primary drivers behind the revisions to the 1989 Model Form 
JOA was to better deal with the problem of the non-paying non-operator in 
the fallout of the oil price crash of the mid-1980s. The recording supplement 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Thanks to Houston attorney Jeff Weems of the law firm of Staff Weems LLP and 
member of the 2015 AAPL Model Form Task Force for pointing out to me that this change to 
Article XIV.C could release an operator from liability for misfiling a UCC financing 
statement.  
 48. See generally DERMAN, supra note 40. 
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was only one of the new features. Article VII of the 1989 JOA, Expenditures 
and Liability of Parties, was the most comprehensive re-write of the section 
of the AAPL Model Form 610 Agreement dealing with defaults in payment 
since the form first appeared in the mid-1950s. 
The drafters of the AAPL 2015 Model Form JOA have essentially kept 
Article VII in the 1989 form intact, with a few minor changes. Three 
provisions of both the 1989 Form and now the 2015 Form can eliminate or 
at least greatly/considerably mitigate the gaming of the process that Mr. 
Green Leisure Suit was so successful with at Exxon’s expense. These three 
provisions, all found in Article VII.D, “Defaults and Remedies,” are 
“Advance Payment,” “Suspension of Rights,” and “Deemed Non-Consent.” 
As usual, there is strength in numbers and it is the interplay among these 
three, complimentary, sections of the AAPL form that can provide such a 
powerful deterrent to non-paying behavior. 
Some might say, why not perform a credit check on the proposed non-
operator at the outset and use that data as the basis for a “go” or “no-go” 
decision before getting in further with a potential non-paying non-operator? 
A credit report may be interesting, but as a practical matter, what happens if 
the report comes back bad? With Mr. Green Leisure Suit, for example, you 
would still be stuck with a leaseholder who owns a significant portion of your 
prospect and who refuses to dilute his interest by farming out. Your 
remaining alternatives absent proceeding with an agreement with Mr. Green 
Leisure Suit are: 1) to abandon your prospect; 2) to drill the well and carry 
him under common law co-tenancy principles; or 3) if you are in a state with 
a strong forced/compulsory pooling regime, to attempt to have a forced 
pooling penalty imposed. 
Common law co-tenancy principles do not provide for sole risk penalties, 
so carrying a party under common law co-tenancy rules is not always a viable 
economic option. As for forced pooling, under practically all forced pooling 
regimes the party being forced pooled must be given an opportunity to join 
the well. Having to allow a party to join the well as a precondition to forced 
pooling puts you back at square one. What if he or she says “yes”? 
So, consider the other option—holding your nose despite the credit report 
(or not even bothering with a credit report), and proceeding to have the non-
operator execute a 2015 Model Form JOA. Then what happens if the non-
operator proves to be non-paying? 
A. Advance Payments 
The key to avoiding being taken advantage of by non-paying non-
operators is relatively simple: get your money up front. If the non-operator 
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does not have sufficient funds to pay for operations, find out early. The 
vehicle for doing this is a JOA’s “Advance Payment” (cash call) provision. 
This provision allows the operator to demand advance payment for the next 
succeeding month’s estimated expenditures. Such provisions have been 
incorporated in all versions of the AAPL Model Form beginning with the 
1956 Form. They are also incorporated in the model form accounting 
procedure published by the Council of Petroleum Accountants Society 
(COPAS), though COPAS provisions and procedures generally reflect and 
complement advance payment provisions in the AAPL 610 Form.49 
Recall earlier that in the instance of Mr. Green Leisure Suit, advance 
payment was sought. The problem in that situation, and under the earlier 
AAPL 610 forms before the 1989 form, was what happens if the party ignores 
advance payment requests and the operator drills a dry hole? An operator’s 
lien in that instance is not worth anything. The operator can sue the defaulting 
non-operator and attempt to collect the debt, but that can take years and, as 
in the case of Mr. Green Leisure Suit, can be thwarted by a bankruptcy filing. 
Even if the well is completed as a producer, nothing would have prevented 
Mr. Green Leisure Suit from taking the well logs to a bank (or his daddy) and 
borrowing his share of the drilling costs. He could then pay off any arrearages 
or operator’s liens and come back into the well as if he had been participating 
from day one with no penalty. 
The earlier versions of the AAPL 610 Agreement provided unscrupulous 
non-operators such “free rides” with no penalty and/or suspension of rights. 
Perhaps even more galling is that the earlier form AAPL agreements still 
entitled the defaulting party to receive full well information. 
The “Advance Payment” provision now found at Article VII.D.4 of the 
1989 and 2015 forms was not conceptually new. What was new about it was 
that it was tied to a new provision within the same Article VII.D.1, 
“Suspension of Rights.” Under the 1989 and 2015 forms, the initial advance 
payment may be requested as early as the first day of the month preceding 
the operation. Once the request for an advance is received, the advance is due 
within fifteen days under the 1989 form, and within thirty days under the 
                                                                                                                 
 49. The most recently published COPAS accounting procedure for onshore operations is 
the 2005 version, which was a revision of a prior version, released in 1984. There was 
substantially no difference between the 1984 and 2005 COPAS procedures with regard to 
Advance Payments. See Jonathan D. Baughman and J. Derrick Price, COPA and the 2005 
COPAS Accounting Procedure—Significant Changes for Changing Times, State Bar of Texas 
Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Bulletin, Section Report, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 28 (March 2005) 
(Appendix–Comparison of Major Provisions in 2005 COPAS Accounting Procedure with 
1984 Onshore Accounting Procedure). 
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2015 form (Article VII.C). The drafters of the 2015 form decided that 
lengthening the period to thirty days was appropriate given the substantial 
sums involved in horizontal operations and the difficulties some parties may 
have in raising such large sums on such short notice.50 
If payment is not received, the operator may then send a thirty-day Notice 
of Default. If the Notice of Default period runs with no response, then under 
Article VII.D.4 of both the 1989 and the 2015 forms the operator may send 
further notice providing for an immediate cash call of any expenses due from 
the non-operator anywhere in the Contract Area, irrespective of whether they 
are or are not related to the new operation. In other words, the operator in this 
situation is not limited to demanding only the next succeeding month’s 
estimated expenses; instead, the operator can cash call for all remaining 
estimated expenses in the proposed operation or any other operation in the 
Contract Area. The expanded cash call is in addition to any other remedies 
provided for in Article VII, including Suspension of Rights and Deemed 
Non-Consent. 
In addition, though not in either the 1989 or the 2015 forms, I recommend 
that operators attempt to negotiate a special provision under Article XVI, 
“Other Provisions,” that expands on the “Advance Payment” provision in 
Article VII of the form to give the operator the right to demand all estimated 
well expenses for a proposed well (not just the next succeeding month’s 
estimated expenses). This not only reduces the operator’s risk of being taken 
advantage of by a defaulting non-operator, but can reduce the administrative 
burden on all parties to the operation by eliminating multiple billing of 30-
day increments within the same operation.51 If a non-operator objected to 
having to prefund such an operation on a time value of money basis, a 
discount could be factored in. An operator would normally be better off 
giving a discount to get non-operators to pay all estimated costs up front 
rather than risk non-payment for succeeding months after the operation is 
underway and the operator has committed to its completion. 
Still another special provision not found in either the 1989 or the 2015 
model JOA is a provision providing for an escrow of plugging and 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Jeff Weems, Changes Incorporated into the AAPL 2015 610 Model Form Joint 
Operating Agreement, Institute for Energy Law 68th Annual Oil & Gas Law Conference 
(2017), http://www.cailaw.org/media/files/IEL/ConferenceMaterial/2017/oilgas/weems -
paper.pdf, at 22.  
 51. See OIL AND GAS LAND: A REFERENCE VOLUME CPL AND RPL EXAM STUDY GUIDE, 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL LANDMEN 171 (11th ed. 2012).  
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abandonment costs. This is another form of advance.52 Essentially the 
operator asks the non-operators to contribute a monthly payment to an escrow 
account to be used when the oil and gas field is abandoned. Otherwise, by 
the time the need arises production may have depleted, and the operator has 
nothing to set off against should the non-operator refuse to pay. 
B. Suspension of Rights 
If the non-operator does not respond within the 30-day Notice of Default 
Period, then under Article VII.D.1 of both the 1989 and the 2015 forms, “all 
of the rights of the defaulting party granted by this agreement may upon 
notice be suspended until the default is cured.” The rights of the defaulting 
party that may be suspended include (paraphrased): 
1. The right to receive information as to any operation (well logs, 
production tests, etc.) 
2. The right to elect to participate in any operation under the 
agreement 
3. The right to receive production proceeds from any producing well 
(or conversely, the right of the operator to set off liabilities of the 
non-operator against production). 
Mr. Green Leisure Suit, therefore, would no longer be getting the well logs 
to use for loan purposes. Likewise, he forfeits his rights to participate in any 
existing production and any future operations. The import of his not be able 
to participate in future operations becomes apparent when Article VII.D.3 of 
both the 1989 and the 2015 forms, “Deemed Non-Consent,” is examined. 
C. Deemed Non-Consent 
The last of the three new features of Article VII.D of the 1989 AAPL form, 
now carried over to the 2015 form, is perhaps the most erosive one of all 
when it comes to the rights of a non-paying non-operator. This is the 
“Deemed Non-Consent” provision found in Article VII.D.3. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Though such provisions are often found in offshore and international operating 
agreements, they are rarer in US onshore JOAs. I credit an article written by Michael C. 
Sanders and presented at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 62nd Annual Institute 
for reminding me to mention. See Michael C. Sanders, Operator Remedies against Defaulting 
Non-Operators, 62 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. INST. § 13.02(1)(e) (2016). Non-operators, of course, 
are not enthusiastic about advancing such costs as the operator usually gets the use of such 
funds for long periods of time and could go bankrupt or otherwise mishandle the escrow.  
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Had either a 1989 Form AAPL Agreement or a 2015 JOA form been in 
place for use with Mr. Green Leisure Suit, immediately following the 
expiration of the 30-day cure period after a Notice of Default, Mr. Green 
Leisure Suit could have been sent a Notice of Non-Consent Election. Mr. 
Green Leisure Suit would have been non-consent subject to sole risk 
penalties despite his earlier election to participate. Significantly, his non-
consent status would be irreversible. No more waiting the well down and then 
taking the well logs to a friendly banker to borrow money to get back into 
the well. 
At this point Mr. Green Leisure Suit would have been much worse off than 
had he farmed out, despite dilution; he would get no overriding royalty during 
payout as is typical under a farmout and, unless the well was extremely good, 
would be unlikely to see any income for years (if ever), waiting on multiple 
sole risk payouts to occur prior to his interest reverting. The operator has the 
last laugh. 
All three of these provisions taken together—“Advance Payments,” 
“Suspension of Rights,” and “Deemed Non-Consent”—permit an operator to 
in effect “Blitzkrieg” a non-operator with fast moving notices of default, 
follow up notices of suspension of rights, and deemed non-consent which 
cumulatively strip the non-operator of practically all right, title and interest 
in the Contract Area, at least until the sole risk penalties pay out. As the coup 
de grâce, I recommend one more special provision which can be added under 
Article XVI, “Other Provisions.” That would be to say that if “deemed non-
consent” provisions are invoked due to a non-operator not paying its bills, 
then the normal sole risk penalties in the JOA are doubled (or even tripled).53 
Now, what about the common law rule that liquidated damages must 
constitute a permissible forecast of damages rather than an impermissible 
penalty? Would doubling the sole risk penalty in a deemed non-consent 
situation pass muster with a court? 
There is no Texas case directly on point. However, there is authority in 
Texas for upholding non-consent penalties in a JOA as permissible forecasts 
of damages.54 
                                                                                                                 
 53. In practice this would mean doubling, for example, the 300% drilling non-consent 
penalty (or whatever the number may be) due by a non-consenting party to 600% if the party 
originally claimed to be a fully participating operator. 
 54. At least one court has viewed non-consent penalties as permissible and held it to be a 
“…mechanism utilized to allow the consenting parties the opportunity to recover their 
investments and receive defined returns from future operations.” Valence Operating Co. v. 
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. 2005). Thus, the court removed them from the context of 
an analysis as a liquidated damages provision 
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But a provision in a JOA doubling the normal non-consent penalty in a 
deemed non-consent situation might be pressing the envelope. It is 
conceivable that a court could find as a matter of law that such a penalty bears 
no reasonable relation to actual damages. But one could make the argument 
that such doubling of the penalty is appropriate to compensate not only for 
actual damages, but for consequential damages as contemplated by the 
agreement (see discussion which follows). Until an appellate court examines 
the issue, having additional sole risk penalties in such situations might at least 
cause a potential non-paying non-operator to think twice.55 
While on the subject of penalties, the drafters of the 2015 AAPL Form at 
the end of Article VII. D.3 have included a usury savings clause intended to 
preclude any non-consent penalty being usurious interest. The provision 
states as follows: 
“to the extent that all or any part of the risk penalty to be 
recovered pursuant to Article VI.B or Article VI.C, as the case 
may be, in connection with the provisions of this Article VII.D. 3, 
is determined to constitute interest on debt, such interest shall not 
exceed the maximum amount of non-usurious interest that may be 
contracted for, taken, reserved, charged or received under law.”56 
This provision was added apparently upon the recommendation of attorneys 
concerned that clients may be sued for usury due to the imposition of sole 
risk penalties under the Model Form AAPL Agreement. I am unaware of any 
case law holdings to this effect but including the provision should put the 
issue to rest and is another reason to use the 2015 Form. 
Something else that many operators forget or at least fail to take action 
upon when non-operators default is that if a party defaults on its payments to 
the operator, the remaining, non-defaulting parties may be required by the 
operator to pay their proportionate shares of the default amounts due to the 
operator. (Article VII.B, 1989 and 2015 forms.). In other words, the operator 
need not be the only “banker” for a defaulting non-operator—the other 
parties to the JOA can be required to bear the burden as well. This is an 
exception to the normal rule under the JOA that liabilities are several, not 
joint and collective. If a party refuses to pay their share of the defaulting 
                                                                                                                 
 55. There has been a move to allow liquidated damages to be judged reasonable or not at 
time of breach, instead of just at the time of contracting. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, The Law of 
Contracts § 14.31 (5th ed. 2003). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.1 
(1981). This trend might bode well for upping liquidated damages when a party breaches a 
JOA by non-payment. 
 56. Weems, supra note 50, at 22–23 (internal quotations omitted). 
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party’s costs, that party can likewise be put on notice of default, suspended, 
deemed non-consent and so forth. 
D. Attorneys’ Fees, Late Payment Interest, Court Costs, Consequential 
Damages 
Last, Article VII of both the 1989 and 2015 AAPL Operating Agreement 
Forms expand upon prior versions of the 610 Agreement with regard to suits 
for damages, attorneys’ fees, late payment interest, court costs and 
consequential damages. These are now all available for recovery against a 
defaulting non-operator despite whether such damages may already be 
provided for under state law. 
There appears to be no case law dealing with what types of consequential 
damages might be available for recovery against a non-operator in these 
situations. Given the exhaustive suspension of rights and deemed non-
consent provisions that may be used against a defaulting non-operator, fact 
situations calling for consequential damages may not be common. Lost 
opportunities in losing a lease by not drilling a well might be such a fact 
situation if the operator could prove that its line of credit was impaired, for 
example, by having to cover for a non-paying non-operator and being left 
short of funds to either purchase a lease or perpetuate it through drilling. This 
could theoretically make a defaulting non-operator liable for the reserve 
value of the lost lease, which could conceivably be tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars or more in consequential damages. Again, the real power 
in the consequential damages provision is that it puts another element of risk 
on the non-operator which in turn might cause it to pause and reflect more 
before defaulting. 
E. Other Changes to Article VII in the 2015 AAPL JOA Form 
One other change to Article VII of the new 2015 Form is worth 
mentioning. Under the 1989 form and prior AAPL forms, if a party was in 
default for its share of expense, interest, or fees, including improper use of 
funds by the Operator, the other parties had the right to collect from the first 
purchaser oil and gas sales proceeds otherwise due the defaulting party until 
the delinquent amounts are made up. The 2015 form changes this provision 
(new language in bold and old stricken through as indicated): 
In addition, upon default by any party in the payment of its share 
of expenses, interests or fees or other financial obligations under 
this agreement, or upon the improper use of funds by the 
Operator a party, the other parties shall have the right, without 
prejudice to other rights or remedies, to collect from the 
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purchaser the proceeds from the sale of such defaulting party’s 
share of the Oil and Gas until the amount owned by such party, 
plus interest as provided for in Exhibit “C,” has been received, 
and shall have the right to offset the amount owed against the 
proceeds from the sale of such defaulting party’s share of Oil and 
Gas. 
This provision in effect provides for a set-off of indebtedness due from 
defaulting parties against their share of oil and gas sales proceeds otherwise 
due from a first purchaser.57 
So what issues were the drafters of the 2015 form attempting to address 
by these changes? The first change, the addition of “or other financial 
obligations under this agreement” (in addition to expenses, fees or interest) 
appears to address obligations such as a non-defaulting party’s share of 
expenses attributable to a defaulting party as discussed in the preceding 
section. Attorney’s fees, consequential damages, court costs, or capital costs 
would now also be unquestionably covered if they were not before. 
The second change was striking the words “the Operator” and substituting 
“a party” in connection with improper use of funds. This change was perhaps 
in recognition that the Operator is not the only party to the JOA who might 
be entrusted with (or accidentally be paid) common account funds. For 
example, what if a first purchaser accidentally remitted a larger percentage 
share of oil and gas proceeds to a party than it was entitled to? Under the 
2015 form the other parties would have the right to offset those improperly 
paid funds against any party to the JOA, not just the Operator. 
There were other less noteworthy, grammatical and relatively minor 
changes made to Article VII of the 2015 form. I applaud the drafters of the 
2015 form both for keeping the wholesale revisions of Article VII of the 1989 
form in place and for improving upon them. 
VI. Issues with Non-Paying Operators 
A discussion of non-paying operators under the AAPL 610 JOA can be 
made relatively short because almost everything brought up so far relative to 
non-paying non-operators under Article VII of the 1989 and the 2015 form 
                                                                                                                 
 57. A common question is whether or not funds can be set off against indebtedness arising 
in other JOA Contract areas or whether funds from other JOA Contract Areas can be used to 
set off default amounts due from another Contract Area. Sometimes case law in a local 
jurisdiction provides for set off of obligations under separate contracts while sometimes it 
does not. Including a broadly worded set-off provision in the JOA might avoid the issue. See 
Sanders, supra note 52, § 13.08 (1).  
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JOAs likewise applies to operators.58 For example, the lien provisions in 
Article VII.B are reciprocal between the non-operators and the operator. Any 
party may record the liens and financing statements and the non-operators 
can demand that the operator, likewise, pay its share of unpaid amounts 
within 120 days of rendition of a statement. The Suspension of Rights, 
Deemed Non-Consent, and Advance Payment upon default provisions 
discussed earlier apply as equally to the operator as to the non-operators. 
 But who takes the lead among the non-operators in pursuing an operator 
who is not paying its own bills? This brings up what I believe is an often-
overlooked provision imbedded in the 1989 and now the 2015 Model Form 
JOA. This provision is found in Article VII.D.1, “Suspension of Rights”: 
If Operator is the party in default, the Non-Operators shall have 
in addition the right, by vote of Non-Operators owning a majority 
interest in the Contract Area after excluding the voting interest of 
Operator, to appoint a new Operator effective immediately. 
 What is the trigger for this operator removal provision under Article VII? 
Unlike the more detailed operator removal provisions found in Article V.B.1 
(“Resignation or Removal of Operator and Selection of a Successor”) in both 
the 1989 and 2015 forms, factual questions such as “good cause” or the 
operator being “no longer being capable” do not factor in. Nor does the 
operator have to file bankruptcy or found to be insolvent. All that is required 
for operator removal under Article VII of both the 1989 and the 2015 forms 
is that any party, including the operator, “fail to discharge any financial 
obligation under this agreement…” (Article VII.D).59 
So, if an operator, for example, were to fail to pay service companies and 
allow liens to attach to the Contract Area, a majority vote of non-operators 
could remove the operator. To put this process in play the non-operators 
would need to send the operator a “Notice of Default” as described above in 
the discussion of the “Suspension of Rights” provision found at Article 
VII.B.1. Similarly, the non-operators can send the operator a Notice of 
                                                                                                                 
 58. This recognition does not minimize issues that can arise between operators and non-
operators. For an excellent and much more comprehensive discussion see Michael C. Sanders, 
Address at the 34th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law Course for the Oil, 
Gas & Energy Resources Law Section of the State Bar of Texas: Disputes between Working 
Interest Owners and Operators (September 29-30, 2016). 
 59. For more detailed discussion of this provision and associated case law, see 
Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves and New Raves: How Case Law Has Affected Form Joint 
Operating Agreements—Problems and Solutions (Part Two), 1 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENERGY J. 165 (2015).  
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Deemed Non-Consent, can demand advances from the operator if default 
amounts are due, can sue the operator for damages including attorney’s fees 
and consequential damages, and can generally avail themselves of all the 
rights and remedies under Article VII that the operator can pursue against 
non-paying non-operators. 
Is Article VII D.1 a reason for a prospective operator to avoid using either 
the 1989 or the 2015 AAPL Form JOAs? If it is, the non-operators should be 
very leery of the prospective operator. Removing an operator for “good 
cause” as defined in Article V.B. 4 of both the 1989 and now the 2015 JOA 
forms arguably submits the operator to a relatively subjective standard as the 
definition of good cause uses words like “gross negligence,” “willful 
misconduct,” “material breach,” and “material inability or failure to 
perform.”60 On the other hand, removing an operator for failing to discharge 
financial obligations after being given notice and an opportunity to cure 
under Article VII.D.1 imposes a relatively objective standard. If an operator 
refuses to pay its share of bills, it should be removed sooner rather than later. 
Article VII.D.1 of both the 1989 and now the 2015 forms provides a 
mechanism for accomplishing this. 
VII. Conclusion: Best Practices in Avoiding Issues 
with Non-Paying Participants 
The drafters of the 1989 and 2015 AAPL Model Form 610 JOAs have 
done such a good job in addressing situations similar to the one I encountered 
with Mr. Green Leisure Suit, that I wonder if a more modern day Mr. Green 
Leisure Suit (the older one having obviously been much slyer than I had 
given him credit for) would ever agree to sign a 1989 or a 2015 AAPL Form 
610 JOA. His or her attorney should advise of the potentially draconian 
consequences of default under the 1989 and 2015 forms with their 
Suspension of Rights and Deemed Non-Consent provisions. That might 
make the non-operator more seriously consider a farm out, which is probably 
what any rational individual or small non-operator should consider doing 
                                                                                                                 
 60. The definitions of “good cause” in both the 1989 and now the 2015 form JOA are 
nearly identical (new language is underlined and deleted language is stricken through): “For 
purposes hereof, “good cause” shall include but not be limited to, mean not only Operators’ 
(i) gross negligence or willful misconduct; (ii) but also the material breach of or inability to 
meet the standards of operation contained in Article V.A or (iii) material failure or inability 
to perform its obligations or duties under this agreement.” 
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before joining a company the size of ExxonMobil in a well and attempting to 
“run with the big dogs.”61 
The 1989 and the 2015 AAPL JOA forms therefore have the potential of 
scaring away certain non-operators. This may be an unintended consequence 
of introducing the 1989 AAPL 610 Form JOA and its changes to Article VII 
(all being carried over into the 2015 AAPL 610 Form)—some non-operators 
may prefer not to agree to it at all rather than risk being made subject to the 
new “Suspension of Rights” and “Deemed Non-Consent” provisions. But 
does an operator want to do business with a non-operator possessing such an 
attitude? 
Regardless, the following are what the author would consider seven best 
practices in avoiding issues with non-paying participants under the AAPL 
Model Form JOA: 
1. Credit Checks. As mentioned earlier, there are practical problems 
with running credit checks on non-operators. If the credit report 
comes back bad, you are still stuck with the non-operator as a co-
tenant and must deal with them whether they sign a JOA or not. 
However, credit checks can be useful. As powerful a tool as Article 
VII of the 1989 and 2015 JOAs is, it may not make much difference 
if the well is a dry hole and there is no production to set off against. 
Having a better idea of the creditworthiness of a proposed JOA 
participant on the front end can assist in risk mitigation. If the credit 
report comes back bad perhaps a letter of credit, a bond, a personal 
guaranty, an upfront advance of all well costs, or a combination of 
the above should be considered. 
Credit checks might also be arguably less important in the age of 
horizontal drilling and fracking because the statistical odds of 
drilling dry holes have been dramatically reduced. Chances are there 
will be production in amounts sufficient to recover drilling and 
completion costs from non-paying operators in horizontally drilled 
and fracked wells, or at least those wells completed in proven areas. 
But not all exploratory wells are drilled in shale formations and not 
all shale wells are sure bets. Attention should always be focused on 
the creditworthiness of all the participants in a proposed JOA, the 
operator included. 
                                                                                                                 
 61. If you do join ExxonMobil or any other large oil company in a well, at least propose 
a cost overrun provision.  
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2. Written JOA. Always have a written Joint Operating Agreement. 
Any loss of control by the operator is offset by the advantages of 
avoiding mining partnership status and rights in dealing with 
defaulting non-operators. 
3. Make Finalization of the JOA a Priority. Do not delay getting the 
operating agreement finalized. If you get nothing else out of this 
paper, come away with an appreciation of the importance of getting 
your money up front by invoking the cash call provisions under the 
JOA. To cash call under a JOA, however, so that suspension of rights 
and so forth can be a remedy, the signed JOA must be in place. Too 
often parties postpone the JOA negotiation to a point so late in the 
process that the well is spudded before cash calls are made. At that 
point the non-paying non-operator can wait out the notice of default 
periods before deciding to pay or not and avoid taking the risk of a 
dry hole if the well reaches target depth soon enough. 
4. Cash Call as Early as Possible. Exercise your rights to “cash call” 
(call for advances) early in the drilling cycle. Stay in communication 
with your company’s (or your client’s) accounting staff and monitor 
the response of the non-operators. Even if you are operating under 
an earlier form JOA, a demand letter can be sent (as a prelude to a 
suit for damages) and an operator’s lien invoked against production 
should the non-operator ignore the cash call. Also, do not forget that 
the remaining, non-defaulting parties can have to cover their share 
of the amounts defaulting parties owe the operator. This is an area 
where engagement and fast action by the operator in taking 
administrative advantage of all the provisions of the JOA can yield 
large dividends. 
5. Record the JOA Memo and Perfect the Financing Statement. 
Timely execute and record a JOA Recording Supplement at least in 
the county, and preferably with both the county and the Secretary of 
State (for UCC Article 9 purposes). This is a relatively easy process 
that can reap dividends if a non-operator becomes insolvent. An 
“ounce of protection…,” as a prominent Texas bankruptcy lawyer 
once wrote, “…is worth [an oil] bbl of cure.”62 In addition, create 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Melko, supra note 12, at 2–3. “Get a recordable interest—and record it….Recent 
bankruptcy cases repeatedly demonstrate that investors have plunked down cash expecting to 
acquire certain assets, only to find that what was delivered was not everything investors 
thought they were getting.” 
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processes that ensure continuation statements are filed after the 
requisite statutory period (usually 5 years) for the previous financing 
statement lapses. 
6. Use the Most Recent JOA Form (2015). Next, switch to the 2015 
AAPL Form as soon as possible. The controversial operator removal 
provisions of the 1989 form have been revised essentially back to the 
1982 version. If a non-operator pushed back on the 2015 JOA form 
because of the “Suspension of Rights” and “Deemed Non-Consent” 
provisions, it raises the questions, why the protest and do you really 
want to do business with them? 
I have “heard” there are still operators in some parts of the United 
States (the Appalachian basin was recently cited to me as one area) 
who are still refusing to consider not only the 2015 and the 1989 
versions of the AAPL Form 610 JOA but also the 1982 AAPL Form 
JOA. In other words, they are still using the 1977 version of the 
AAPL Form 610 Agreement over 40 years after it was issued and 
now with the third superseding version released. If this is true— well, 
let us just say those operators are running against the tide of history. 
So if you have not done so already, get familiar with the new 2015 
AAPL Form JOA and incorporate it wholeheartedly into future 
negotiations. 
7. Special Provisions. Last, consider adding special provisions to 
Article XVI, “Other Provisions,” so 1) an operator can cash call all 
well costs, not just the succeeding month’s estimated expenditures; 
2) to provide that the sole risk penalties in “deemed non-consent” 
situations are doubled (or tripled); 3) escrow accounts for plugging 
and abandonment costs; and 4) broadly worded set off provisions 
allowing revenues from another JOA Contract Areas to be applied 
against indebtedness (assuming the law of the local jurisdiction 
allows).63 
All of the above of course requires time and effort and today’s overworked 
landmen, company attorneys and affiliated private counsel or other personnel 
may question whether the potential benefit outweighs the risk. 
                                                                                                                 
 63. There are numerous other special provisions that are beyond the scope of this article, 
but which should be considered when negotiating JOAs. See, e.g., DERMAN, supra, note 40, 
at 127–85. See also Mark A. Mathers & Christopher S. Kulander, Additional Provisions to 
Form Joint Operating Agreements, 33 OIL, GAS AND ENERGY SECTION REPORT, STATE BAR OF 
TEXAS (Dec. 2008). 
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For justification, I will refer to the paragraph from my earlier article on 
this subject which I quoted earlier in this paper. The best practices referenced 
above seem consistent with prudent planning for both worst- and best-case 
oil price scenarios. Insurance always seems expensive until one has a claim. 
Providing more insurance for clients and oil companies against insolvent 
participants by taking some of the simple steps outlined above may be 
worthwhile in dealing with the uncertainties of the future. As Shakespeare 
wrote: “[t]o fear the worst often cures the worse.”64 In more modern English, 
planning for a worst-case outcome can sometimes prevent the worst from 
happening. 
 As I mentioned in closing the original version of this paper, there is yet 
one more “best” practice not listed above but still worth considering. If an 
individual ever comes in your office wearing a very dated green leisure suit 
with a gold pukka shell necklace and proposes that he partner with your 
company or your client in an oil and gas well, first—be wary.  
Second—ask him to give the author a phone call, there is old business to 
discuss. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, act 3, sc. 2. 
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